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Social Enterprise As Commitment: A Roadmap 
Alicia E. Plerhoples

 
INTRODUCTION 
When launching a social enterprise, the budding entrepreneur has 
an expansive menu of for-profit entity options to fuse social mission 
with revenue-producing commercial activities. She can form a low-
profit limited liability company,
1
 benefit limited liability company,
2
 
benefit corporation,
3
 public benefit corporation,
4
 or social purpose 
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 1. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/1-26 (2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-29-102–
113 (2010); Daniel S. Kleinberger, A Myth Deconstructed: The “Emperor’s New Clothes” on 
the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879 (2010); Carter G. Bishop, 
The Low-Profit LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment by Proxy or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. 
REV. 243 (2010); J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, 
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 
66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2011); Robert Lang & Elizabeth Carrott Minnigh, The L3C, History, 
Basic Construct, and Legal Framework, 35 VT. L. REV. 15 (2010). 
 2. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-1101–1108(a) (West 2013). 
 3. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§ 1701–1709 (McKinney 2012); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§§ 14600–14631 (West 2015); Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporation—A Sustainable 
Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591 (2011) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, 
Benefit Corporation]; J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, 
Certifications and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) [hereinafter 
Murray, Choose Your Own Master]; William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit 
Corporations are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
817 (2012).  
 4. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-101-501–509 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§§ 361–368 (2014); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: 
Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247 (2014) [hereinafter Plerhoples, Delaware 
Public Benefit Corporations]; J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s 
Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345 (2014) [hereinafter Murray, Social 
Enterprise Innovation]; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making it Easier for Directors to Do the Right Thing, 
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corporation
5
 to pursue dual missions simultaneously. These hybrid 
entities have particular appeal to social entrepreneurs precisely 
because they eschew many of the regulatory constraints of public 
charities and secure a social mission within a single for-profit entity. 
Scholars continue to debate whether these hybrid forms facilitate 
mission-accountability as a positive matter, and some have called for 
reform.
6
 Nonetheless, a small cohort of hybrid entities have 
incorporated in numerous states.
7
  
As evidenced by their choice of a for-profit form, founders of for-
profit social enterprises are committed to market-based mechanisms 
and business techniques. They seek to employ revenue-generating 
commercial activities to fund solutions to social and environmental 
problems. Often, commercial activity is the solution to a social or 
 
4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235 (2014); J. William Callison, Benefit Corporations, Innovation, and 
Statutory Design, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 143 (2014). 
 5. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500-2517 (West 2014); WASH. REV. CODE. 
§§ 23b.25.005–25.150 (2014). See also Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New 
Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 
13 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 221 (2012) [hereinafter Plerhoples, Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles]. California renamed the “flexible purpose corporation” to “social 
purpose corporation” as of January 1, 2015. S.B. 1301, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2013). 
 6. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag With Fly Paper: A 
Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495 (2013) (discussing the 
failure of the L3C, benefit corporation and flexible purpose corporation forms to enforce social 
mission commitments); Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms of Social Enterprise, 62 
EMORY L.J. 681 (2013) (proposing alternative legal mechanisms to ensure pursuit of a social 
good) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms of Social Enterprise]; Murray, Choose 
Your Own Master, supra note 3, at 33 (arguing that corporate boards be required to prioritize 
the stakeholder interests the corporation will pursue); Plerhoples, Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles, supra note 5, at 262–63 (proposing a heightened judicial standard of 
review for director actions for flexible purpose corporations). But see Brett H. McDonnell, 
Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 
FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. LAW 19, 20 (2014) (arguing that the benefit corporation statutes “got it 
right. They create enough risk of liability that managers must pay attention to their legal duties, 
allowing courts to help shape norms of appropriate behavior, while not imposing such high risk 
that this promising new business form becomes unattractive.”).  
 7. Kate Cooney et al., Benefit Corporation and L3C Adoption: A Survey, STAN. SOC. 
INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/benefit_corporation_ 
and_l3c_adoption_a_survey (finding that as of July 2014, 998 benefit corporations and 1,015 
low-profit limited liability companies exist in the United States). See also Plerhoples, Delaware 
Public Benefit Corporations, supra note 4, at 247–80 (finding that fifty-five public benefit 
corporations were created in Delaware in the first three months of changes to the Delaware 
General Corporation Law, which allowed the formation of benefit corporations). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/10
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environmental problem.
8
 Such is the case when for-profit social 
enterprises hire and train formerly incarcerated, homeless, or other 
hard-to-employ people.  
For-profit social enterprises are “hybrid” enterprises in the sense 
that they borrow principles from both the charitable and corporate 
sectors. However, for-profit social enterprises lack the charitable and 
corporate sectors’ principal accountability mechanisms.9 For-profit 
social enterprises are not constrained by the doctrines of private 
inurement and private benefit as charities are. The doctrine of private 
inurement prohibits distribution of the public charity’s net earnings to 
insiders.
10
 The doctrine of private benefit requires that the public 
charity be organized and operated for a public and not a private 
benefit.
11
 Contrary to these doctrines, which are intended to keep 
nonprofit managers faithful to the nonprofit’s charitable mission, 
insiders of a for-profit social enterprise are not prohibited from 
profiting from the firm.
12
  
Hybrid entities also lack a principal accountability mechanism of 
for-profit corporations—shareholder primacy.13 This lack of 
accountability puts hybrid entities at risk of mismanagement, director 
self-enrichment, and corporate waste. Social enterprises are 
 
 8. For alternative definitions of social enterprise, see Alicia Plerhoples, Representing 
Social Enterprise, 20 CLINICAL L. REV. 215, 223–34 (2013).  
 9. See generally Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 387, 432–36 (2014) (discussing the insufficiency of social enterprise law to 
ensure social mission and the distinctions between for-profit and nonprofit regulator regimes).  
 10. United Cancer Council, Inc., v. Comm’r, 165 F.3d 1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(interpreting I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).  
 11. “An organization is not organized or operated exclusively for one or more of the 
purposes specified in subdivision (i) of this subparagraph unless it serves a public rather than a 
private interest . . . .” 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)–(d)(1)(ii) (2014). See also Henry B. Hansmann, 
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (coining the phrase “the 
nondistribution constraint” to describe the doctrine of private inurement, which prohibits the 
distribution of corporate assets to insiders). 
 12. Clark & Babson, supra note 3, at 838–39 (describing the benefit corporation as a 
response to shareholder primacy).  
 13. Shareholder primacy is “the idea that corporate management’s primary responsibility 
is to promote the economic interests of shareholders.” David Millon, Radical Shareholder 
Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1013, 102–24 (2013). However, shareholder primacy is 
a relatively weak accountability mechanism for for-profit corporations. Id. at 1019–23 
(discussing the inability of shareholders to hold directors accountable due to information 
asymmetry and the protections that directors have from shareholder derivative lawsuits). 
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“operating in a conceptual and regulatory no-man’s-land . . . where 
their activities may be regulated only by the good intentions of their 
founders and managers . . . .”14 Absent legal reform, if “good 
intentions” are all that social enterprise managers have, what can they 
do to express, implement, and realize such good intentions? One 
answer lies in developing governance processes and policies that 
internalize, express, and self-regulate the social enterprise’s 
commitment to its social mission. 
This Article contributes to the field of law and entrepreneurship
15
 
by presenting a commitment approach to social enterprise governance 
within the bounds of existing social enterprise laws. Commitment to 
the amelioration of a social or environmental problem is a central 
attribute of social enterprise. Commitment can operate as an 
organization’s identity, reigning in conflict between social mission 
and financial profitability when managers face difficult decisions 
over costs and resource allocation. A commitment approach is one in 
which for-profit social enterprise founders and the board of directors 
adopt governance policies and processes that aid in mission 
accountability, transparency, and stakeholder governance in the early 
stages of the firm. Adoption of a commitment approach at the highest 
levels of the organization aids in creating an organizational identity 
of commitment that reverberates through the entire organization.  
This Article presents a roadmap of a commitment approach in the 
early stages of a social enterprise that is organized as a benefit 
corporation, public benefit corporation, or social purpose corporation. 
Part I introduces a fictional start-up social enterprise used to illustrate 
the proposed commitment approach. This Part also presents a central 
 
 14. Shruti Rana, Philanthropic Innovation and Creative Capitalism: A Historical and 
Comparative Perspective on Social Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility, 64 
ALA. L. REV. 1121, 1146 (2013). In another scholar’s words, “one of the primary problems with 
current benefit corporation statutes is the lack of guidance the statues provide for boards of 
directors.” Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 3, at 27. Directors are told that the 
must engage in stakeholder governance, but are not told how. Id. 
 15. Laura A. Costanzo et al., Dual-Mission Management in Social Entrepreneurship: 
Qualitative Evidence from Social Firms in the United Kingdom, 52 J. SMALL BUS. MGMT. 655, 
658 (2014) (defining “entrepreneurship research” as “the scholarly examination of how, by 
whom, and with what effects opportunities to create future goods and services are discovered, 
evaluated, and exploited.”). Contra Benjamin Means, A Lens for Law and Entrepreneurship, 6 
OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS L.J. 1 (2011) (arguing that law and entrepreneurship is not a 
field but a lens or critical perspective that spans various legal fields).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/10
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problem facing social enterprises: managing and pursuing dual social 
and economic missions in a single entity. Part II defines 
“organizational identity” as “the central and enduring attributes of an 
organization that distinguish it from other organizations,”16 and 
discusses the importance of an organizational identity of commitment 
to social entrepreneurs in combatting tensions between dual missions. 
Part III presents a framework for expressing commitment to the 
amelioration of a social or environmental problem as a central and 
enduring attribute of an organization’s identity through particular 
governance choices, policies, and procedures. Specifically, this 
Article calls for a social enterprise that is organized as a benefit 
corporation, public benefit corporation, or social purpose corporation 
to (1) declare a social mission that is specific and therefore capable of 
assessment; (2) task its entire board of directors to safeguard the 
firm’s social mission; (3) embrace normative stakeholder governance 
that empowers stakeholders to participate in corporate decision-
making, and (4) annually evaluate and publicly report its social 
and/or environmental performance using transparent, standardized, 
and assessable metrics.  
This commitment approach is not presented as a panacea to hybrid 
corporate forms’ weak accountability mechanisms. Rather, the 
roadmap presented is an attempt to guide social enterprises in 
implementing existing legal requirements and voluntarily overcoming 
statutory weaknesses by adopting additional constraints that 
internalize, self-regulate, and express a commitment to the 
amelioration of a specific social or environmental problem. Because 
hybrid corporate forms are new, guidance on implementation is 
lacking, placing the entire social enterprise sector at risk of 
marginalization. Without guidance, social enterprises that adopt the 
hybrid corporate forms may violate the new laws’ basic requirements, 
face “mission drift,” and engage in so-called “greenwashing.”17   
 
 16. David A. Whetten, Albert and Whetten Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of 
Organizational Identity, 15 J. MGMT. INQUIRY 219, 220 (2006).  
 17. See infra notes 26–30 (discussing “mission drift” and “greenwashing”). 
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I. A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE CASE STUDY  
A. Nourish Nutritional Bars 
Lola Oguntoye is a budding social entrepreneur. Having worked 
at a community foundation for several years after college, Lola 
enrolls in business school. While in graduate school, Lola’s mother 
sends her fresh produce from their family farm in Georgia. Lola 
begins making homemade nutritional bars and smoothies to get her 
through exhaustive study periods. She shares the bars and smoothies 
with her friends and often hands them out to homeless people she 
passes on her way to class. She has stumbled upon an idea. Lola 
begins plans to launch a social enterprise—Nourish, a producer of 
food products that combat hunger. Lola envisions that for each 
Nourish nutritional bar or smoothie sold, Nourish will donate a bar or 
smoothie to poor and low-income individuals through food banks, 
community centers, churches, and homeless shelters. Lola also hopes 
to sustainably and locally source ingredients. Her long-term goals 
include creating jobs for low-income and hard-to-employ people, 
possibly by headquartering the company in a low-income 
community, and working with local nonprofits to create a job-training 
pipeline.  
Lola’s business school setting allows her to obtain the business, 
marketing, and strategic advice of her professors and peers. She 
receives advice to jettison the smoothie product line and launch 
solely with nutritional bars. Smoothies require refrigeration and do 
not have a long shelf life, raising distribution costs. Additionally, 
food banks are less likely to accept a product that requires 
refrigeration. She perfects her recipes and launches Nourish in a co-
working commercial kitchen not far from campus. She uses her 
contacts at the community foundation where she previously worked 
to establish partnerships with food banks, shelters, community 
centers, and churches to which Nourish bars will be donated. Lola’s 
business school also provides her with the opportunity to network 
with potential investors. Lola enters several start-up competitions at 
school, winning one and attracting start-up financing from a group of 
social impact investors.     
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Social Enterprise As Commitment 95 
 
 
Lola is launching a social enterprise with dual missions—social 
and economic. The earnings from product sales will support the 
product donations. If they do not, then Lola will have to restructure 
her operations, at best moving away from a one-to-one ratio of 
donations to sales, and at worst shuttering the social enterprise. It is 
likely too, that Lola and Nourish’s social impact investors want to 
profit personally from the social enterprise. Lola expects a salary as 
the chief executive, but she is dedicated to using the social enterprise 
to combat food insecurity in low-income neighborhoods. She views 
this mission as the reason the business exists, as opposed to a 
business run for profit that sometimes engages in philanthropy. 
Similarly, Nourish’s investors expect a return though, as social 
impact investors, they may be satisfied with a below-market rate of 
return.  
B. The Problem: Serving Two Masters  
Legal scholars refer to a social enterprise’s pursuit of dual 
missions as “serving two masters,” i.e. stockholders and 
stakeholders.
18
 Social enterprise founders and managers must manage 
tensions amongst competing interests by virtue of their firm’s pursuit 
of social and financial value. Management scholars describe these 
tensions as “dual mission-management.”19 At each step, social 
enterprise managers must balance commercial activities, “which are 
critically important for the economic sustainability of the enterprise, 
with investments aimed at achieving social outcomes.”20 Social 
enterprise managers also have to manage a diverse set of expectations 
from multiple stakeholders; such expectations can “vary from the 
demands for high social value to the demands for high economic 
value.”21 Dual-mission management affects managers’ resource 
 
 18. See, e.g., Barnali Choudhury, Serving Two Masters: Incorporating Social 
Responsibility into the Corporate Paradigm, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 631 (2009); Brakman Reiser, 
Theorizing Forms of Social Enterprise, supra note 6, at 683; Plerhoples, Applying Traditional 
Corporate Law Principles, supra note 5, at 223.  
 19. See Costanzo et al., supra note 15, at 659–60 (describing managing the tensions 
amongst firm’s stakeholders as “dual-mission management”).  
 20. Id. at 659. 
 21. Id. at 660.  
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allocation, investment decisions, and decisions related to employee 
recruitment and retention.
22
 Firms with dual missions also face 
potential costs such as “organizational inaction or vacillation”23 and 
loss of “legitimacy and loyalty”24 when the firm upholds one mission 
to internal or external stakeholders who prefer the other mission.
25
 
Additionally, dual-mission management may result in 
“greenwashing.”26 Although originally applied to environmental 
issues, greenwashing also applies to any firm’s claim that its 
activities or actions improve the environment or society, or address 
an environmental or social problem. Greenwashing involves 
diversion, deception, and hypocrisy.
27
 Broadly, “there is wrongdoing, 
distraction in the form of a ‘wash,’ and at its heart, an underlying 
structural problem never receives proper redress.”28 Notably, the 
actions that constitute greenwashing for a specific firm will depend 
on what the firm has committed to do. A firm cannot engage in 
greenwashing if it never committed to an underlying environmental 
or social action. Greenwashing is therefore a particularly acute 
problem for social enterprises, because they claim to create social and 
environmental value. For example, Nourish operates a one-to-one 
donation model. That is, for every nutritional bar sold, Nourish 
donates one nutritional bar to poor and low-income individuals. 
Nourish has committed to this one-to-one donation model and would 
be engaging in “greenwashing” if it instead donated one nutritional 
bar for every three nutritional bar sold. Nourish’s deception would 
also be illegal under federal truth-in-advertising laws and possibly 
state charity laws.
29
  
 
 22. Id. at 659.  
 23. Michael G. Pratt & Peter O. Foreman, Classifying Managerial Responses to Multiple 
Organizational Identities, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 18, 22 (2000).  
 24. Id. at 23.  
 25. Id. at 22.  
 26. Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281, 284–86 (2014) (describing the origins and 
definitions of the term “greenwashing”).  
 27. Id.  
 28. Id. at 286.  
 29. The U.S. Federal Trade Commission enforces truth-in-advertising laws found in the 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58, as amended. Specifically, it is illegal to 
disseminate false advertisements. Id. § 52. State attorney general offices generally regulate 
charity laws to “protect[] charitable assets, protect[] consumers and investors from fraud and 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/10
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A precursor to “greenwashing” is mission drift, “where the pursuit 
of profit starts to overshadow the pursuit of public benefit.”30 Social 
and environmental value is often difficult to objectively evaluate and 
quantify, creating the potential for managers to knowingly or 
unwittingly focus on financial value for insiders at the expense of 
social or environmental value. For example, Nourish managers might 
determine that the company would be more profitable if it reduces the 
nutritional value of the bars that are donated. This operational shift 
represents a “drift” away from mission in exchange for profits.  
II. MITIGATING THE DUAL-MISSION PROBLEM 
As she launches her social enterprise, Lola wants to mitigate the 
tension between pursuing dual missions. Part II argues that Lola can 
do so by creating an organizational identity that embraces integrated 
social and economic missions in the early stages of the social 
enterprise through governance principles and policies at the highest 
levels of the organization. 
A. Commitment as Organizational Identity  
Organizational identity means the collective “central and enduring 
attributes of an organization that distinguish it from other 
organizations.” Central and enduring attributes of an organization are 
“[a]ttributes that are manifested as an organization’s core programs, 
policies and procedures, and that reflect its highest values.”31 
Attributes are “central and enduring” if they have “passed the test of 
time or on some other basis operate as ‘irreversible’ commitments.”32 
Managers rely upon central, enduring, and distinctive attributes to 
ensure that the organization “avoid[s] acting out of character.”33 
 
deception, and safeguard[] the general public interest.” Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating 
Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 231, 240 (2014). Nonetheless, it is debatable 
whether state attorney generals have or will invoke the authority to regulate social enterprises. 
Id. at 240–45.  
 30. Joseph W. Yockey, The Compliance Case for Social Enterprise, 4 MICH. BUS. & 
ENTREPRENURIAL L. REV. 1, 6 (2014). 
 31. Whetten, supra note 16, at 222. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Id. at 221.  
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These attributes: 
[F]unction as organizational identity referents for members 
when they are acting or speaking on behalf of their 
organization, and they are most likely to be invoked in 
organizational discourse when member agents are grappling 
with profound, fork-in-the-road, choices—those that have the 
potential to alter the collective understanding of “who we are 
as an organization.”34  
The central and enduring attributes that comprise an organization’s 
identity guide members participating in the enterprise to act 
consistently with the organization’s values. Some businesses may 
lack any impetus to create an organizational identity, particularly in 
their early stages when they have insufficient financial resources to 
create a distinctive identity. Start-ups often do not have financial 
resources to hire lawyers, accountants, or human resource managers 
to implement internal controls and policies that aid in creating an 
organizational identity. Nonetheless a social enterprise is, by 
definition, a values-based firm. A social enterprise’s values comprise 
its organizational identity. A social enterprise that ignores its 
organizational identity—its values—is at risk of mission drift, 
greenwashing, and other problems that arise from dual-mission 
management. 
Values across social enterprises may vary. Some social enterprises 
may value environmental mission and disregard social justice, or vice 
versa. Nonetheless, the single value common to all social enterprise is 
commitment to ameliorating a social or environmental problem, 
whatever that problem may be, rather than pursuing solely 
shareholder value. Commitment to the amelioration of an 
environmental or social problem is a central and enduring attribute of 
social enterprise. Legal scholars routinely describe social enterprise 
in terms of commitment.
35
 Leo Strine describes commitment as an 
imperative for benefit corporations:  
 
 34. Id. at 220–21.  
 35. See infra notes 37–44; see also Murray & Hwang, supra note 1, at 17 (“Another 
problem in choosing the LLC form for social enterprises is the lack of assurance that an LLC is 
either intended to be or will remain an organization committed to charitable primacy.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/10
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In particular, the first wave of entrepreneurs who drape 
themselves in the benefit corporation garb bear a special 
responsibility for the movement’s ultimate fate. If their 
commitment to social responsibility is simply a green-washed 
cloak for a desire to squeeze out profits for themselves and 
stockholders by feigning but not actually having a sincere 
regard for other corporate constituencies, the benefit 
corporation movement will quickly lose credibility among 
socially responsible investors and policymakers.
36
  
Professor Joseph W. Yockey writes that “[s]ocial enterprises 
originate . . . from commitments to larger values (e.g., social justice 
or environmental sustainability) and apply those values to every 
strategic decision.”37 Professor Brett McDonnell observes that social 
enterprises “want to credibly commit in order to encourage the 
involvement of investors, customers, and employees who want to be 
involved in an enterprise which cares about more than just the 
interests of shareholders.”38 Professor Miriam A. Cherry also 
describes corporate social responsibility (CSR) in terms of 
commitment.
39
 Every firm has a choice about how much it will 
commit to CSR or pursue a social mission. Some firms view laws as 
prices to pay when violated rather than obligations to be upheld. 
Some firms acquiesce to laws to satisfy business stewardship.
40
 A 
slightly greater commitment entails voluntarily engaging in CSR or 
corporate philanthropy. Some firms “take CSR to the next level, for 
example, integrating triple bottom line concepts into their definitions 
of long-term growth and company success.”41 And still yet some 
firms go beyond triple bottom line business models and commit 
themselves to charitable, social, or environmental work that is 
 
 36. Strine, supra note 4, at 249. 
 37. Yockey, supra note 30, at 5.  
 38. McDonnell, supra note 6, at 29 (“Traditional corporation law provides little assistance 
in helping social enterprises create such a credible commitment.”). 
 39. Cherry, supra note 26, at 288.  
 40. Id. (“While that may seem problematic, Professor Joseph Grundfest notes that merely 
the act of complying means that many important laws, regulations, and decrees that are 
embodied in regulatory acts are followed; he suggests that on its own compliance results in a 
large amount of (regulatory-mandated) corporate pro-social behavior.”).  
 41. Id.  
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supported or accomplished through commercial activities. 
Additionally, committing to a social mission is relatively easy “when 
incentives for profit and social goals align.”42 Committing to a social 
mission is more difficult when profit and social goals are in 
conflict.
43
 
Thus, a necessary corollary of commitment is constraint. That is, 
where a social enterprise is committed to its social or environmental 
mission, it must also constrain itself from taking actions that 
contradict, ignore, or weaken its social or environmental mission. 
Such constraint is not typical of for-profit corporations, which can be 
formed to “conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes.”44 
Forms of constraint vary—constraint can arise from law or voluntary 
action. The latter is the case when firms voluntarily seek special 
certifications such as “Fair Trade,” “B Corp,” or “USDA Organic” 
certifications.
45
  
As will be discussed throughout this Article, hybrid corporate 
forms have weak accountability mechanisms. Therefore, a 
commitment approach requires a social enterprise to take additional 
voluntary actions to commit to its social or environmental mission. 
B. Implementing Commitment through Governance 
Organizational identity can be shaped through intentional 
construction. One study of social firms in the United Kingdom (UK) 
suggests that formalization of commitment to dual missions is key to 
reconciling dual-mission tensions. The study found that:  
[H]igh levels of formalization of both economic and social 
objectives tend to lessen paradoxes, tensions, and conflicts that 
 
 42. Id. at 288.  
 43. Id. 
 44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 101(b) (2014). 
 45. FAIR TRADE USA, http://fairtradeusa.org/certification (last visited Apr. 13, 2015) (Fair 
Trade USA certifies businesses through supply chain audits and requiring businesses to 
purchase supplies from other Fair Trade certified firms); How to Become a B Corp, B LAB, 
http://www. bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp (last visited Apr. 13, 
2015) (B Lab certifies businesses for their social and environmental performance); USDA 
Agricultural Marketing Service, http://www.ams.usda.gov/AMSv1.0/nopfaqshowcertified (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2015) (The USDA certifies farms and handling facilities as “USDA Organic” if 
they meet certain USDA regulations). 
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are generally associated with dual identities. Reconciliation of 
such apparent dualities/conflicts requires, first of all, a high 
level of commitment from the upper echelon of the 
organization. Then formalization is crucial as it gives 
relevance, via visibility, to such commitment and pursuit of 
both sides of the mission, so that everybody’s actions are 
purposefully aligned.
46
 
Construction of an organizational identity of commitment within an 
organization happens at the highest level of the organization—within 
its governing principles and policies. Corporate governance is the 
collection of processes and practices in place for controlling and 
directing the corporation.
47
 The process of identifying, clarifying, and 
formalizing the corporation’s social and environmental mission 
through a system of governance can align founder and directors’ 
objectives and reinforce their commitment to such objectives.  
Nonetheless, while the UK study suggests that formalization aids 
in reconciling dual-mission tensions, the size and scope of this single 
study limit its conclusions.
48
 As the social enterprise sector grows, 
future research must examine how social enterprises successfully 
manage dual tensions, and the commitment approach proposed in this 
Article can be tested.
49
   
 
 46. Costanzo, supra note 15, at 671. The findings of this study are “context dependent” in 
that it was a qualitative study of U.K. social firms that may operate differently than social 
enterprise firms elsewhere. Id. at 673.  
 47. Heiko Spitzeck & Erik G. Hansen, Stakeholder Governance: How Stakeholders 
Influence Corporate Decision Making, 10 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. BUS. SOC. 378, 379 
(2010) (quoting Adrian Cadbury, The Corporate Governance Agenda, 8 CORP. GOVERNANCE: 
INT ‘L REV. 7, 8 (2000)). 
 48. The UK study is limited pertains to particular UK social firm laws. Costanzo, supra 
note 15, at 673.  
 49. Insights on dual mission management also derive from empirical studies of 
stakeholder governance, corporate social responsibility, and environmental sustainability 
strategies of non-social enterprise firms. See, e.g., Alice Klettner, Thomas Clarke & Martijn 
Boersma, The Governance of Corporate Sustainability: Empirical Insights into the 
Development, Leadership and Implementation of Responsible Business Strategy, 122 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 145 (2013) (presenting the results of a empirical analysis of the governance processes 
and related sustainability strategy used by large Australian companies as disclosed in their 
annual sustainability reports).  
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III. A COMMITMENT APPROACH TO SOCIAL ENTERPRISE  
A. Adopt a Hybrid Entity  
The commitment approach to social enterprise entails the formal 
adoption of governance policies and procedures that work to make 
commitment to the social mission a central and enduring attribute of 
the social enterprise’s organizational identity. Lola’s first step to 
formalize Nourish’s commitment to a social mission requires 
choosing an entity.  
Lola could establish multiple entities: one for-profit company to 
conduct business operations and the second a tax-exempt 
organization to oversee charitable donations and job training services. 
The two entities could operate in a parent-subsidiary structure with 
the nonprofit as the parent entity. Or they could operate in tandem 
with the relationship governed through a series of contracts. The 
creation of multiple entities facilitates compartmentalization, 
“whereby an organization chooses to preserve multiple identities but 
does not seek to attain any synergies between them.”50 
Compartmentalization can reduce dual-mission tensions: 
[T]he multiple identities—of the nonprofit social mission and 
the for-profit business mission—are continued but kept 
separate from each other through physical, spatial, or symbolic 
means to reduce the potential for conflict between the multiple 
identities of the organization.
51
  
Despite the benefits of compartmentalization, hybrid entity forms 
were created to allow a single entity, rather than multiple entities, to 
pursue dual missions.
52
 Lola also prefers a single entity because she 
wishes to manage and be involved in both the charitable and profit-
making operations. If the operations were split between two entities, 
 
 50. Brett R. Smith et al., Social Enterprises and the Timing of Conception: 
Organizational Identity Tension, Management, and Marketing, 22 J. NONPROFIT & PUB. 
SECTOR MKTG. 123 (2010). 
 51. Id. 
 52. For a comprehensive discussion of the shareholder primacy, and the limits on for-
profit companies to pursue social or environmental missions, see Clark & Babson, supra note 3, 
at 825–38.  
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and she were to manage both, the charity would be scrutinized by the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) for possible violations of the 
doctrines of private inurement and private benefit and for 
impermissible contributions to the for-profit company.
53
 Lola would 
also find burdensome the administrative and financial responsibility 
of launching two entities simultaneously.  
Lola has a range of options if she wishes to launch a single 
entity,
54
 including the new hybrid corporate forms, e.g., the benefit 
corporation, public benefit corporation, and social purpose 
corporation. These hybrid corporate forms carry similar legal 
requirements, with only a few variations. They present off-the-shelf 
options that aid in creating an organizational identity with a 
commitment to social mission. This Article proceeds under the 
 
 53. For a detailed explanation of the restrictions related to managing nonprofit and for-
profit tandem structures, see Ingrid Mittermaier & Joey Neugart, Operating in Two Worlds: 
Tandem Structures in Social Enterprise, 26 No. 1 PRAC. TAX LAW. 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.adlercolvin.com/pdf/social_enterprise/Operating_in_Two_Worlds_Tandem_Structu
res_in_Social_Enterprise_%28403192%29.pdf. 
 54. Lola could form Nourish as a C corporation, limited liability company, or non-
corporate hybrid forms such as the low-profit limited liability company (L3C) and the benefit 
limited liability company (benefit LLC). An L3C is a limited liability company formed to 
attract investment from both the private and nonprofit sectors. An L3C is organized to advance 
one or more “charitable or education purposes,” as defined by the IRC, and may be formed as 
either a freestanding business with a social purpose or as a for-profit subsidiary of a non-profit 
organization. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
11, § 3001(27)(A)(i) (West 2013). The L3C form was designed to attract program-related 
investments (PRIs) by private foundations. J. William Callison & Allan Vestal, The L3C 
Illusion: Why Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal 
Private Foundation Investment in Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 282 (2010); 
see also Bishop, supra note 1, at 248–49; John A. Pearce II & Jamie Patrick Hopkins, 
Regulation of L3Cs for Social Entrepreneurship: A Prerequisite to Increased Utilization, 92 
NEB. L. REV. 260, 268 (2013). As such, income creation or property appreciation cannot be a 
significant purpose of the company, and the L3C must not pursue political or legislative 
purposes. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26 (West 2014); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, 
ch. 21, § 3001(27)(C) (West 2014). A benefit LLC is similar to a benefit corporation, but is a 
limited liability company. A benefit LLC must have the purpose of creating a general public 
benefit or a “material, positive impact on society and the environment, as measured by a third-
party standard, through activities that promote a combination of specific public benefits.” MD. 
CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 4A-1106(a)(1), -1101(c) (West 2013). Specific public benefits 
include providing individuals or communities with beneficial products or services, promoting 
economic opportunity beyond the normal creation of jobs, preserving the environment, and 
improving human health. Id. §§ 4A-1106(b)(1), -1101(d). The manager of a benefit LLC must 
also engage in stakeholder governance in making decisions, such that the manager must 
consider the effects of any LLC action or inaction on a range of stakeholders, including 
members, employees, customers, communities, and the environment. Id. § 4A-1107(a). 
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assumption that Nourish is organized as one of these hybrid corporate 
forms, and examines each in turn. 
1. Benefit Corporation  
A benefit corporation is a for-profit entity that has a purpose of 
creating general public benefit, defined as “a material positive impact 
on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation.”55 Directors of a benefit corporation must engage in 
stakeholder governance by considering a wide variety of stakeholders 
when discharging their duties as directors.
56
 Directors cannot pick 
and choose which stakeholders to consider.
57
 Additionally, a two-
thirds vote of the shareholders of each class is required to terminate 
the benefit corporation’s status as a benefit corporation58 or amend 
the benefit corporation’s specific purpose (if it has one).59 Benefit 
corporations are also required to prepare an annual benefit report that 
assesses the company’s performance in creating general public 
 
 55. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 102, 201(a) (2014). A benefit corporation 
may also choose to identify one or more specific public benefits to support, in addition to its 
general public benefit mandate. Id. § 102 cmt. Specific public benefits include “providing low-
income or underserved individuals or communities with beneficial products or services,” 
“protecting or restoring the environment,” and “promoting the arts, sciences or advancement of 
knowledge.” Id. § 102. 
 56.  Id. § 301(a). Directors of a benefit corporation must consider: 
[T]he effects of any action or inaction upon: (i) the shareholders of the benefit 
corporation; (ii) the employees and work force of the benefit corporation, its 
subsidiaries, and its suppliers; (iii) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the 
general public benefit or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation; 
(iv) community and societal factors, including those of each community in which 
offices or facilities of the benefit corporation, its subsidiaries, or its suppliers are 
located; (v) the local and global environment; (vi) the short-term and long-term 
interests of the benefit corporation, including benefits that may accrue to the benefit 
corporation from its long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best 
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation; and (vii) the ability 
of the benefit corporation to accomplish its general public benefit purpose and any 
specific public benefit purpose . . . . 
Id.  
 57. Infra notes 101–03. 
 58. § 105(a). 
 59. Id. § 201(d). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol48/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2015]  Social Enterprise As Commitment 105 
 
 
benefit against a third-party standard.
60
 The report must be accessible 
to shareholders and the public.
61
 
Twenty-six states and the District of Columbia have adopted 
legislation that allows use of the benefit corporation form.
62
 Most 
have used the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (“Model 
Legislation”) drafted by lawyer Bill Clark63 in conjunction with B 
Lab, the nonprofit organization that lobbies for states’ adoption of the 
benefit corporation form and certifies companies as “B Corp,” a 
designation distinct from the benefit corporation.
64
 Some states have 
adopted slightly modified versions of the Model Legislation. For 
example, the D.C. Benefit Corporation Statute requires a “benefit 
director” to sit on a D.C. benefit corporation’s board of directors.65 
Among other things, the benefit director is charged with opining on 
whether the benefit corporation has acted in accordance with its 
general public benefit.
66
 Other states, such as California, do not label 
any members of the board as “benefit directors” or delegate any 
duties to specific directors.
67
 The Model Legislation requires the 
boards of publicly traded benefit corporations to appoint a benefit 
director.
68
 For the sake of comparison to other hybrid corporate forms 
in this Article, unless otherwise noted, any reference to a benefit 
corporation refers to one formed in a state that has adopted the Model 
Legislation. 
 
 60. Id. § 401.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Kevin Ercoline, Beyond Puffery: Providing Shareholder Assurance of Societal Good 
Will in Crowdfunded Benefit Corporations, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 169, 178 (2014); see also State 
by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-
legislative-status (last visited Feb. 16, 2015). This count of twenty-six states that have adopted 
the benefit corporation includes Delaware, Colorado, and Minnesota, which have adopted the 
“public benefit corporation,” a variation of the benefit corporation form. See discussion Infra 
Part III.A.1. 
 63. BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., Model Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/ 
attorneys/model-legislation (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).  
 64. The Nonprofit Behind B Corps, B LAB, http://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-
corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited April 13, 2015); supra note 45. 
 65. D.C. CODE § 29-1303.02 (West 2015). 
 66. Id.  
 67. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 14600–14631 (West 2015) (no references to a “benefit 
director” are found within the California Corporations Code).  
 68. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 302(a). 
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2. Public Benefit Corporation 
The public benefit corporation is similar to, but distinct from, the 
benefit corporation.
69
 The public benefit corporation form has been 
adopted in Delaware,
70
 Colorado,
71
 and Minnesota.
72
 Because 
Delaware is the most prominent state for corporate law, references to 
public benefit corporations in this Article refer to those formed in 
Delaware. Like the benefit corporation, the Delaware public benefit 
corporation is also a for-profit entity structured to produce a public 
benefit
73
 and operate in a “responsible and sustainable manner.”74 
However, the public benefit corporation must adopt a specific public 
benefit and identify it in its certificate of incorporation.
75
 The 
certificate of incorporation can only be amended with the approval of 
two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of voting and non-
voting stock of the corporation.
76
 A public benefit corporation is not 
required to assess its performance against a third-party standard, but 
Delaware law explicitly allows the corporation to adopt a third-party 
standard.
77
 Benefit reports are only required biennially and need not 
be accessible to the public.
78
   
 
 69. See Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit, supra note 4, at 254–55. 
 70. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362 (2014). 
 71. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-101-503 (2014). 
 72. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.102 (West 2015). 
 73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2014). Public benefit is defined as “a positive effect 
(or reduction of negative effects) on 1 or more categories of persons, entities, communities or 
interests (other than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but not limited 
to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, educational, environmental, literary, 
medical, religious, scientific or technological nature.” Id. § 362(b). 
 74. Id. § 362(a). 
 75. Id. § 362(a)(1). 
 76. Id. § 363(c). 
 77. Id. §§ 362(a)(1), 366(c)(3). 
 78. Id. § 366(b), (c)(2). 
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3. Social Purpose Corporation 
Social purpose corporations are for-profit corporations that may 
pursue social or environmental benefit along with financial profit. 
The social purpose corporation form has been adopted in California,
79
 
Washington,
80
 and Florida.
81
 Again, each state has varying legal 
requirements despite the common nomenclature. Under the 
Washington Business Corporation Act, social purpose corporations 
must “promote positive short-term or long-term effects of, or 
minimize adverse short-term or long-term effects of, the 
corporation’s activities upon any or all of (1) the corporation’s 
employees, suppliers, or customers; (2) the local, state, national, or 
world community; or (3) the environment.”82 The California Social 
Purpose Corporation Act contains similar language regarding the 
purpose of a California social purpose corporation.
83
 Alternatively, a 
California social purpose corporation can be organized for “[o]ne or 
more charitable or public purpose activities that a nonprofit . . . is 
authorized to carry out.”84 This Article refers to both Washington and 
California social purpose corporations.  
A social purpose corporation may also adopt and pursue one or 
more specific social purposes.
85
 Under Washington law, the board of 
directors of a social purpose corporation must annually prepare a 
 
 79. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–17 (West 2014). 
 80. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 23b.25.005–.150 (2014). 
 81. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.504 (West 2014). 
 82. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.020 (West 2014).  
 83. One of the authorized purposes of a California social purpose corporation is:  
The purpose of promoting positive effects of, or minimizing adverse effects of, the 
social purpose corporation’s activities upon any of the following, provided that the 
corporation consider the purpose in addition to or together with the financial interests 
of the shareholders and compliance with legal obligations, and take action consistent 
with that purpose: 
 (i) The social purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers, customers, and creditors. 
 (ii) The community and society. 
 (iii) The environment.  
CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(B) (West 2014) 
 84. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2014). 
 85. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.030 (West 2014); see also CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 2602(b)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2014). 
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social purpose report in accordance with a third-party standard and 
make it publicly accessible.
86
 Under California law, the board of a 
social purpose corporation must prepare a special purpose 
management discussion and analysis (special purpose MD&A) 
assessing the corporation’s performance with respect to its special 
purpose.
87
 Under both Washington and California law, a two-thirds 
vote of shareholders of each class is required to amend the 
corporation’s social purpose.88 Both Washington and California law 
also allow the firm’s articles of incorporation to require a shareholder 
vote greater than two-thirds. Delaware law and the model benefit 
corporation legislation do not grant such flexibility.
89
  
4. Branding and Signaling Value 
Each of these corporate forms provides branding value to a social 
enterprise. Indeed, legal scholars have previously noted that the main 
benefit of such forms is branding.
90
 In one qualitative study, 
management scholars examined the identity tension between dual 
missions of nonprofit social enterprises.
91
 The study suggests that a 
social enterprise that incorporates a dual mission from its inception 
“experience[s] relatively less identity tension”92 than a business that 
adopts a social mission or a nonprofit that adopts a commercial 
 
 86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.040(2)(b) (West 2014); What is Required from 
SPCs?, SOCIAL PURPOSE CORPS., http://www.spcwa.com/how_to_spc/spc-responsibilities/ (last 
visited Jan. 24, 2015).  
 87. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3501 (West 2014) (The special purpose current report must be 
made public “to the extent consistent with reasonable confidentiality requirements, shall cause 
the special purpose current report to be made publicly available by posting it on the social 
purpose corporation’s Internet Web site or providing it through similar electronic means”). 
 88. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.090 (West 2014); CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000(b) 
(West 2014). 
 89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(c)(1) (2014); MODEL LEGISLATION § 201(d). 
 90. Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 3, at 622 (arguing that social 
entrepreneurs pick hybrid entity forms in order to create a brand, but noting that “[w]hether the 
benefit corporation form can effectively function as such a brand . . . depends on whether it is a 
credible proxy for truly dual mission entities.”); see also Murray, Choose Your Own Master, 
supra note 3 (noting that “public branding” in the form of sanctioned hybrid corporate forms 
can confer significant benefits on social enterprise).  
 91. Smith, supra note 50, at 108. 
 92. Id. at 120.  
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activity well into its life cycle.
93
 The early adoption of a hybrid 
form—and hence a dual mission—signals to investors, customers, 
employees, and other stakeholders that the firm intends to pursue 
social or environmental value, and not solely shareholder value. This 
signaling may attract directors, investors, and employees committed 
to the dual mission.
94
 
There are many drawbacks to the hybrid corporate forms. 
Potential investors may not be knowledgeable about the new forms 
and therefore be hesitant to invest. The corporate form is as yet 
untested, with no case law interpreting the fiduciary duties of 
directors, making it a potentially risky choice for directors and 
investors alike. Social enterprise founders will also need to attract 
investors who are comfortable with the enterprise pursuing social 
value along with financial value.
95
 Importantly, no hybrid corporation 
has gone public, raising questions about the viability of scaling a 
hybrid corporation.
96
 
 
 93. Id. at 120–23.  
 94. Cf. Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise, 85 CHIC.-
KENT L. REV. 619, 643 (2010) (discussing how the branding value of certified B corporations 
may attract directors, investors, and employees who value blended enterprise). 
 95. Id. at 650 (“All of a B corporation’s investors, however, must be willing if not eager 
to invest their funds in an entity that will not pursue the funds’ growth as its predominant 
objective. Thus, whether the B corporation form will increase the financing available for 
blended entities depends largely on the success of its branding efforts and the size of the market 
for investments such as these.”). 
 96. Etsy Inc., a certified B corporation, went public in April 2015, and raised $267 
million, indicating some appetite for social enterprises by mainstream investors. Additionally, 
by the terms of its B corporation certification with B Lab, Etsy must convert to a Delaware 
public benefit corporation by August 1, 2017 or lose its certification. If Esty converts, it could 
be the first publicly traded Delaware public benefit corporation and pave the way for future 
public hybrid corporations.  Alex Barinka, Etsy’s IPO Is a Direct Challenge to Wall Street’s 
Beliefs, BLOOMBERG.COM (Apr. 2, 2015, 10:17 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2015-04-02/etsy-s-ipo-is-a-direct-challenge-to-wall-street-s-beliefs (“The company’s 
certification will eventually run out, and then Etsy has two choices: It can let it expire, or it 
would have to change to what’s considered a legally recognized public benefit corporation—a 
move that would codify its responsibility to “stakeholders” (employees, community members, 
and other noninvestors) alongside its fiduciary responsibility to shareholders. No publicly 
traded company has done that yet, and the barrier is high. It would require approval of the board 
as well as an “extraordinarily high vote” of 90 percent of the shareholders.”); see also J. Haskell 
Murray, Etsy’s Dilemma, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2015), http://lawprofessors. 
typepad.com/business_law/2015/03/etsys-dilemma-.html; Hiroko Tabuchi, Etsy I.P.O. Tests 
Pledge to Balance Social Mission and Profit, N. Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2015/04/17/business/dealbook/etsy-ipo-tests-pledge-to-emphasize-social-mission-over-
profit.html.  
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By adopting a hybrid corporate form, entrepreneurs like Lola 
commit to a dual mission at the outset of the organization and signals 
to stakeholders the company’s intention to pursue dual missions. 
Nonetheless, adopting a hybrid corporate form will not suffice if it is 
the only step taken. Given weak statutory accountability mechanisms 
adoption of a hybrid corporate form is an initial, minimal step.  
B. Declare a Specific Mission 
The next step in the proposed commitment approach requires 
defining a social mission. The benefit corporation, public benefit 
corporation, and social purpose corporation forms each allow 
Nourish to establish and state a social mission in Nourish’s corporate 
charter.  
1. Benefit Corporation 
Benefit corporations formed in states using the Model Legislation 
must pursue a general public benefit, or “a material positive impact 
on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a 
third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
corporation.”97 As comments to the Model Legislation explain, “the 
concept of general public benefit requires consideration of all of the 
effects of the business on society and the environment.”98 This legal 
requirement has been criticized as vague and impractical, and an 
exacerbation of the “dual mission-management” problem because it 
requires directors to promote a “material positive impact” across 
multiple factors “taken as a whole.”99 Directors are not given the 
legal authority to prioritize certain impacts over others:  
Requiring social enterprise directors to consider an 
unprioritized group of stakeholders while also requiring a 
corporate purpose that looks at societal and environmental 
impact as a whole is not only unworkable, but could also 
exclude corporations with a more specific mission. A 
 
 97. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102. 
 98. Id. § 102 cmt. (emphasis added). 
 99. Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 3, at 32–33. 
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corporation with a focused and specific public purpose at its 
core is more likely to pursue that purpose because the objective 
is more easily identified by directors. A more specific public 
purpose (or a prioritizing of certain stakeholders within a more 
general public purpose) would also provide a more workable 
system of board accountability.
100
 
Benefit corporations formed in states that follow the Model 
Legislation have the option of declaring a specific public benefit.
101
 
However, this option does not aid in mitigating the dual-mission 
management problem. The Model Legislation makes clear that the 
corporation’s declaration of a specific public benefit does not 
substitute for the general public benefit: “The identification of a 
specific public benefit under this subsection does not limit the 
purpose of a benefit corporation to create general public benefit 
. . . .”102 Even while declaring a specific public benefit, directors and 
officers of a benefit corporation must pursue both the general public 
benefit and specific public benefit, and are unable to focus solely on a 
specific social mission.
103
  
2. Public Benefit Corporation 
Delaware public benefit corporations, must create a public benefit, 
or “a positive effect (or reduction of negative effects) on [one] or 
more categories of persons, entities, communities or interests (other 
than stockholders in their capacities as stockholders) including, but 
not limited to, effects of an artistic, charitable, cultural, economic, 
educational, environmental, literary, medical, religious, scientific or 
technological nature.”104 The public benefit overlaps with, and 
expands upon, the exempt purposes for 501(c)(3) organizations found 
in the Internal Revenue Code.
105
 Moreover, unlike the benefit 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(b). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b) (2014). 
 105. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2010). Exempt purposes are “religious, charitable, scientific, 
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or international 
amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic 
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corporation, the public benefit corporation’s public benefit can be 
tailored to its operations. When forming the public benefit 
corporation, the incorporator can choose “[one] or more categories of 
persons, entities, communities or interests” to benefit, rather than 
pursue positive impact across multiple stakeholders.
106
  
Delaware law further requires that one or more specific public 
benefits—as opposed to general public benefits—be stated in a public 
benefit corporation’s certificate of incorporation.107 For example, the 
incorporator of a public benefit corporation could presumably choose 
to prioritize a scientific impact on the public rather than an 
environmental one.  
3. Social Purpose Corporation 
The articles of incorporation of a California social purpose 
corporation must enumerate the corporation’s special purposes.108 
This requirement echoes the duty of public benefit corporations to 
identify specific public benefits (whereas this is optional for benefit 
corporations). Additionally, the articles of incorporation must contain 
one of two general social purposes. The articles must include either 
(1) a statement that the corporation is organized to engage in 
“charitable or public purpose activities that a nonprofit public benefit 
corporation is authorized to carry out;”109 or (2) a statement that the 
corporation has the purpose of: 
[P]romoting positive effects of, or minimizing adverse effects 
of, the social purpose corporation’s activities upon any of the 
following, provided that the corporation consider the purpose 
in addition to or together with the financial interests of the 
shareholders and compliance with legal obligations, and take 
action consistent with that purpose: 
 
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.” Id. However, 
501(c)(3) organizations must be “organized and operated exclusively” for an exempt purpose. 
Id. Public benefit corporations do not have to exclusively pursue a public benefit.  
 106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(b) (2014). 
 107. Id. § 362(a)(1). 
 108. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(A) (West 2015). 
 109. Id. 
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 (i) The social purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers, 
customers, and creditors. 
 (ii) The community and society. 
 (iii) The environment.
110
 
Statutory interpretation of the word “any”—as opposed to “all”—
indicates that not all stakeholders need be considered by a social 
purpose corporation under California law. Therefore, a California 
social purpose corporation can tailor its operations to benefit a group 
of particular stakeholders.  
4. Define a Specific Social Mission 
Declaring a specific public benefit or special purpose facilitates 
mission accountability. Such a declaration requires directors to 
prioritize a specific mission rather than have more diffuse 
obligations.
111
 A drawback of the benefit corporation form is that the 
Model Legislation does not allow prioritization of public benefits—
all affects of the business on society must be considered.
112
  
Lola considers whether to adopt a specific public benefit or 
special purpose for her company, but anticipates tension between 
Nourish’s social and economic missions. Declaring a specific public 
benefit or social purpose binds the firm to a particular social mission. 
The specific mission is a defining feature of Nourish’s organizational 
identity of commitment.  
However, problems may result from adopting a narrow, specific 
public benefit or special purpose. If the mission is stated too 
narrowly, the corporation may be unable to pursue new and 
unexpected social or economic opportunities that do not align with its 
stated mission. For example, if Nourish’s specific mission identifies 
Lola’s local community as the targeted beneficiaries of Nourish’s 
donated goods, Nourish will be constrained from serving other 
communities unless it amends its specific public benefit statement in 
its articles of incorporation. In order to maintain flexibility, Lola 
 
 110. Id. § 2602(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added). 
 111. Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 3, at 32–33.  
 112. See discussion supra notes 101–03. 
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could craft a specific public benefit that is categorical and generic. 
For example, Nourish’s specific public benefit could state: “Nourish 
seeks to ameliorate the effects of poverty around the world.” This 
specific public benefit provides the social enterprise with flexibility 
to shift future operations away from combating hunger if new 
opportunities arise. Nonetheless, such a categorical and generic 
description fails to provide a distinct standard against which the 
company’s social and environmental performance can be assessed. 
As a benefit corporation, public benefit corporation, or social purpose 
corporation, Nourish must issue an impact report assessing the extent 
to which it has promoted its specific public benefit.
113
 An overly 
broad and vague statement of its specific public benefit or special 
purpose is not capable of assessment, and therefore does not 
contribute to corporate accountability. Here, for example, it is unclear 
which poverty issues Nourish will target. This statement also fails to 
provide any guidance to directors on what particular constituencies to 
prioritize. Furthermore, such vagueness may be taken as a sign of the 
lack of commitment to a social mission or greenwashing.
114
 
As a consequence of the above concerns, Nourish adopts the 
following statement in its corporate charter: “Nourish’s specific 
public benefit [or special purpose] is to ameliorate hunger, food 
insecurity, and the by-products of hunger and food insecurity in 
disadvantaged, poor, and low-income communities.” This social 
mission identifies hunger and food insecurity as the societal problems 
Nourish will ameliorate, and identifies disadvantaged, poor, and low-
income communities as the targets of Nourish’s operations. 
Lola can enhance accountability to the company’s social mission 
by making Nourish’s specific public benefit or special purpose 
publicly available, and not solely embedded in a quasi-public 
document like its corporate charter. Lola plans to embed Nourish’s 
specific public benefit or special purpose statement in all of the 
company’s internal and external materials. Placing the statement on 
internal documents, like employee manuals and governance policies, 
 
 113. See discussion Part III.E. 
 114. Cherry, supra note 26, at 285 (citing The Seven Sins, UNDERWRITERS LABS, 
http://sinsofgreenwashing.org/findings/the-seven-sins (last visited Jan. 22, 2014)). “Vagueness” 
is one of the Seven Sins of greenwashing. Id. 
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conveys a committed organizational identity to employees. Similarly, 
placing the statement on external documents such as contracts and 
promotional materials communicates a committed organizational 
identity to vendors, distributors, suppliers, and nonprofit partners. 
Placing the statement on the corporation’s website exhibits to 
consumers an organizational identity of commitment to this particular 
social mission. 
C. Commitment & Oversight from the Board 
Nourish’s specific public benefit or special purpose statement will 
also help Lola recruit directors for the board. A commitment 
approach to social enterprise requires the entire board to act as the 
fiduciary of the corporation’s social mission, as well as commit to 
govern the corporation through stakeholder engagement, as will be 
discussed below. A social enterprise’s board can formalize its duties 
through a document that puts prospective and current board members 
on notice of their duties. Board duties general to corporations include 
the duty of care
115
 and the duty of loyalty.
116
 Legal duties required of 
the directors of a hybrid corporate form include the directors’ duty to 
balance the pecuniary interests of the corporation’s stockholders and 
stakeholders, and the duty to promote the corporation’s declared 
public benefit or special purpose. With the help of an attorney, Lola 
creates a “Board Roles and Responsibilities” document to provide to 
each potential board member to advise them of their board duties, 
including those particular to being a hybrid corporation. 
Notably, neither the public benefit corporation nor social purpose 
corporation statutes create a separate board or officer role for 
overseeing the production of the public benefit statement or social 
purpose report, or for promoting the public benefit or social purpose. 
In contrast, the board of directors of a benefit corporation may 
appoint an independent benefit director.
117
 The primary role of the 
benefit director is to opine in the benefit report: 
 
 115. See, e.g., CAL CORP. CODE §§ 309, 2700, & 5231(a) (West 2015) (codifying the duty 
of care for corporations, social purpose corporations, and nonprofit corporations). 
 116. See, e.g., id. §§ 310 & 5233 (codifying prohibition of certain conflicts of interest). 
 117. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 302(a) & (b). “Independent” means that the 
benefit director has no material relationship with the benefit corporation or a subsidiary of the 
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(1) Whether the benefit corporation acted in accordance with 
its general public benefit purpose and any specific public 
benefit purpose in all material respects during the period 
covered by the report. 
(2) Whether the directors and officers complied with sections 
301(a) [relating to directors’ standard of conduct] and 303(a) 
[relating to officers’ standard of conduct], respectively. 
(3) If, in the opinion of the benefit director, the benefit 
corporation or its directors or officers failed to act or comply in 
the manner described in paragraphs 1 and 2, a description of 
the ways in which the benefit corporation or its directors or 
officers failed to act or comply.
118
 
The benefit director’s role provides transparency to shareholders “as 
to whether the directors have adequately discharged their stewardship 
of the benefit corporation and its resources.”119  
In the Model Legislation, the benefit director’s role is limited. The 
benefit director does not implement the corporation’s general public 
benefit; implementation is the responsibility of the benefit officer. 
The benefit officer has “the powers and duties relating to the purpose 
of the corporation to create general public benefit or specific public 
benefit.”120 The benefit officer also prepares the benefit report on 
which the benefit director opines.
121
 The benefit officer position is 
optional,
122
 and the benefit director may also serve as the benefit 
officer.
123
  
Although the Model Legislation declares the benefit director as 
the principal overseer of the corporation’s general public benefit, it 
would be folly for the rest of the board of directors to take a laissez-
 
benefit corporation, other than his or her capacity as the benefit director. Id. § 102. The benefit 
director cannot be or have been an employee of the benefit corporation within the last three 
years, or have a beneficial or record ownership of the benefit corporation of five percent or 
more. Id. 
 118. Id. § 302(c). 
 119. Id. § 302 cmt. 
 120. Id. § 304(b)(1). 
 121. Id. § 304(b)(2). 
 122. Id. § 304(a). 
 123. Id. § 302(b). 
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faire approach to pursuing and safeguarding the social enterprise’s 
mission. Just as “the board of a tax-exempt organization is 
collectively responsible for developing and advancing the 
organization’s mission,”124 all directors must meet the standard of 
conduct required by law. A benefit corporation’s board and its 
individual directors are tasked with considering the impact of 
corporate actions on various stakeholders and the corporation’s 
general public benefit.
125
 Similarly, all officers of the corporation 
must consider the impact of the corporate actions on stakeholders if 
“the officer has discretion to act with respect to a matter” and “it 
reasonably appears to the officer that the matter may have a material 
effect on the creation by the benefit corporation of general public 
benefit or a specific public benefit . . . .”126 Consequently, a 
committed approach to a social mission does not confine the 
oversight or implementation role to just a few corporate actors. The 
approach requires commitment from the highest level of the 
organization—the board of directors as a whole and any officers or 
management in a position to make strategic decisions on behalf of the 
corporation.  
D. Embrace Normative Stakeholder Governance 
The proposed commitment approach also requires that directors 
embrace normative stakeholder governance.
127
 Stakeholder 
governance refers to a governance method by which directors and 
officers of a corporation consider the financial and non-financial 
returns to the corporation’s stakeholders.128 Stakeholders may include 
employees, shareholders, creditors, suppliers, customers, the 
 
 124. BRUCE R. HOPKINS & VIRGINIA GROSS, NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: LAW, PRACTICES, 
AND TRENDS 14 (1st ed. 2009). 
 125. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 301(a). 
 126. Id. § 303(a). 
 127. See infra notes Part III.D.5. 
 128. For a decisive description and defense of stakeholder theory, see Robert Phillips, R. 
Edward Freeman & Andrew C. Wicks, What Stakeholder Theory Is Not, 13 BUS. ETHICS Q. 479 
(2003). See also RAJ SISODIA, JAG SHETH & DAVID WOLFE, FIRMS OF ENDEARMENT: HOW 
WORLD-CLASS COMPANIES PROFIT FROM PASSION AND PURPOSE, at xi (2d ed. 2014) (arguing 
that companies that use “stakeholder relationship management” have a competitive advantage 
and realize higher returns).  
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community members of the community in which the corporation 
operates, and the natural and physical environment the corporation 
affects. As will be examined below, the hybrid corporation laws vary 
in requiring stakeholder governance. The board of a public benefit 
corporation or benefit corporation is required to engage in 
stakeholder governance. Whether the board of a California social 
purpose corporation must engage in stakeholder governance depends 
on which one of two special purposes it adopts. The board of a 
Washington social purpose corporation has discretion whether to 
engage in stakeholder governance.  
1. Benefit Corporation & Public Benefit Corporation  
According to the Model Legislation and the Delaware Corporate 
Code sections relating to the public benefit corporation, directors of 
either corporation must engage in stakeholder governance. Benefit 
corporation directors must consider the effects of any corporate 
action on a wide range of stakeholders.
129 
Similarly, the Delaware 
public benefit corporation statute states that directors must manage 
the corporation “in a manner that balances [(i)] stockholders’ 
pecuniary interests, [(ii)] the best interests of those materially 
 
 129. For example, when discharging their duties, directors of a New York benefit 
corporation must consider: 
 (A) the ability for the benefit corporation to accomplish its general and any specific 
public benefit purpose; 
 (B) the shareholders of the benefit corporation; 
 (C) the employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and its subsidiaries and 
suppliers; 
 (D) the interests of customers as beneficiaries of the general or specific public 
benefit purposes of the benefit corporation; 
 (E) community and societal considerations, including those of any community in 
which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation or its subsidiaries or suppliers are 
located; 
 (F) the local and global environment; and 
 (G) the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation, including 
benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its long-term plans and the 
possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of the 
benefit corporation . . . . 
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1707(a) (McKinney 2012). 
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affected by the corporation’s conduct, and [(iii)] the public benefit or 
public benefits identified in its certificate of incorporation.”130 
Professor J. Haskell Murray notes that the word “balance” used in the 
Delaware statute may be “more onerous” than the word “consider” 
used in the Model Legislation:  
“Balance” could mean giving exactly equal weight to each 
factor, but more likely means giving some weight to each 
factor. “Consider,” however, only requires directors to think 
about each factor and could allow directors to completely 
disregard a factor after considering it. It is unclear from the 
commentary whether Delaware’s use of “balance” over 
“consider” was purposeful or important to the drafters.131 
Statutory interpretation of the words “balance” and “consider” is not 
likely to be settled until a court interprets them, or state legislatures 
provide additional guidance.  
2. California Social Purpose Corporation 
Whether directors of a California social purpose corporation must 
engage in stakeholder governance seemingly depends on the special 
purpose that the corporation has chosen. A California social purpose 
corporation must choose one of two special purposes. The 
corporation can adopt “[t]he purpose of promoting positive effects of, 
or minimizing adverse effects of, the social purpose corporation’s 
activities upon any of the following, . . . .:  
(i) The social purpose corporation’s employees, suppliers, 
customers, and creditors. 
(ii) The community and society. 
(iii) The environment.
132
 
Alternatively, the social purpose corporation can adopt “one or more 
charitable or public purpose activities that a nonprofit public benefit 
 
 130. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2014) (emphasis added).  
 131. Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 4, at 355.  
 132. CAL. CORP. CODE § 2602(b)(2)(B)(i)–(iii) (West 2015). 
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corporation is authorized to carry out.”133 The former special purpose 
expresses stakeholder governance, similar to the public benefit 
corporation and benefit corporation. The later special purpose has 
little to do with stakeholder governance and instead allows the social 
purpose corporation to act as a for-profit charity. 
Regardless of whether the former or latter special purpose is 
chosen, the California Act also grants directors significant discretion 
in determining which factors to consider when discharging their 
duties. The California Social Purpose Corporation Act (California 
Act) states that: 
In discharging his or her duties, a director shall consider those 
factors, and give weight to those factors, as the director deems 
relevant, including the overall prospects of the social purpose 
corporation, the best interests of the social purpose corporation 
and its shareholders, and the purposes of the social purpose 
corporation as set forth in its articles.
134
 
A director can weigh factors “as the director deems relevant.”135 This 
language implies that a director can prioritize constituents and factors 
using her business judgment.
136
 Whether this statutory interpretation 
of fiduciary duties will hold true remains to be seen. There has been 
no case law to test the fiduciary duties of directors of California 
social purpose corporations.  
3.  Washington Social Purpose Corporation  
Unlike directors of a public benefit corporation or benefit 
corporation, directors of a Washington social purpose corporation are 
permitted, but not required, to consider various stakeholders when 
 
 133. Id. § 2602(b)(2)(A). 
 134. Id. § 2700(c) (emphasis added). 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. The business judgment rule for a California social purpose corporation is codified: 
“A director shall perform the duties of a director, including duties as a member of any 
committee of the board upon which the director may serve, in good faith, in a manner the 
director believes to be in the best interests of the social purpose corporation and its 
shareholders, and with that care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person 
in a like position would use under similar circumstances.” Id. § 2700(a). 
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performing their duties.
137
 A “social purpose” under Washington law 
is a business purpose carried out “in a manner intended to promote 
positive short-term or long-term effects of, or minimize adverse 
short-term or long-term effects of, the corporation’s activities upon 
any or all of (1) the corporation’s employees, suppliers, or customers; 
(2) the local, state, national, or world community; or (3) the 
environment.”138 The Washington statute contains permissive, non-
restrictive language with respect to director duties to ensure the social 
purpose: “in discharging his or her duties as a director, the director of 
a social purpose corporation may consider and give weight to one or 
more of the social purposes of the corporation as the director deems 
relevant.”139 The use of the permissive word “may” instead of the 
obligatory word “shall” could be interpreted to allow directors to 
disregard social purposes when carrying out their duties. 
Additionally, a director can consider what social purposes she 
“deems relevant.”140 Whether this permissive language was intended 
or the result of poor drafting is unclear.  
4. Constraint with Flexibility in Execution 
Where consideration of social mission and stakeholders is not 
required, but permissive—as with the Washington social purpose 
corporation—dual mission tensions may be exacerbated. Without 
legal requirement, directors and managers need not make their 
strategic or management decisions based on the social enterprise’s 
social mission or affected stakeholders. Directors are essentially 
given a blank check to align their fiduciary duties with any set of 
stakeholders, including shareholders. Additionally, where 
consideration of stakeholders cannot be prioritized—as with benefit 
corporations following the Model Legislation
141—obligations may be 
too diffuse to manage as directors attempt to account for all 
stakeholders. Requiring stakeholder governance, but giving directors 
discretion to prioritize stakeholders may aid in dual mission 
 
 137. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.050(2) (West 2012). 
 138. Id. § 23B.25.020. 
 139. Id. (emphasis added). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See discussion supra Part II.B.1. 
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management. This approach—taken by the Delaware public benefit 
corporation and the California social purpose corporation if the 
stakeholder governance special purpose is chosen—provides a legal 
constraint with flexibility in how to execute it. The flexibility 
provided, however, must be put to good purpose. Directors should 
not use the wide discretion granted to them by the hybrid corporate 
statutes to pick and choose amongst stakeholders to benefit 
themselves or solely enhance the corporation’s financial bottom line. 
Directors must work to create a meaningful framework for 
prioritizing stakeholders and obtaining stakeholder input in a manner 
that enhances stakeholder value and aligns with the corporation’s 
social mission. This framework then acts as the basis for which 
directors and management make their strategic and management 
decisions on behalf of the social enterprise. A commitment approach 
therefore requires putting such a framework in place to provide 
guidance to decision-makers. A possible framework is discussed 
below. 
5. Stakeholder Participation & Power  
Stakeholder theory has “conceptual breadth. The term means 
different things to many different people and hence evokes praise or 
scorn.”142 Instrumental stakeholder governance dictates that “the 
corporation needs to pay attention to only those stakeholders who can 
affect the value of the firm.”143 According to this subtheory, 
stakeholder governance is an instrument of shareholder wealth 
maximization. In contrast, normative stakeholder theory has a “moral 
foundation.”144 
Normative stakeholder theory . . . grants stakeholder claims 
intrinsic value due to the moral rights of any individual 
affected by corporate conduct. Central questions of normative 
stakeholder theory consider rights and duties of the actors 
 
 142. Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, supra note 128, at 479.  
 143. Spitzeck & Hansen, supra note 47, at 380; see also Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, supra 
note 128, at 496.  
 144. Phillips, Freeman & Wicks, supra note 128, at 481.  
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involved and how a just balance of concerns of different 
stakeholders can be achieved.
145
 
Because instrumental stakeholder theory relies on shareholder wealth 
maximization it is antithetical to social enterprise, the purpose of 
which is to pursue both social and financial value. The proposed 
commitment approach to social enterprise thus rejects instrumental 
stakeholder governance and embraces normative stakeholder 
governance. Utilizing normative stakeholder governance, social 
enterprise directors should implement stakeholder engagement 
mechanisms that empower stakeholders to participate in corporate 
decision-making.  
Spitzeck and Hansen conducted a qualitative study of forty-six 
organizations and identified seventy-six different stakeholder 
engagement mechanisms.
146
 Spitzeck and Hansen categorized the 
stakeholder engagement mechanisms according to stakeholder power 
and stakeholder scope. Stakeholder power “refers to the level of 
influence stakeholders are granted in corporate decision making.”147 
On one hand, stakeholders can be given no power to participate in 
any decision-making.
148
 On the other hand, stakeholders can possess 
power to make corporate decisions.
149
 “Scope refers to the breadth of 
power in corporate decision making and usually spans along the line 
of deciding on isolated local issues to decisions affecting the general 
business model of the organization.”150 The researchers analyzed the 
forty-six organizations for evidence of how each corporation’s 
demonstration of stakeholder engagement actually impacted 
corporate decision-making. Their results showed that 74 percent of 
the corporations took “an instrumental approach in granting 
stakeholders more access to corporate decision making.”151 An 
instrumental approach to stakeholder engagement contrasts sharply 
with normative stakeholder governance: 
 
 145. Spitzeck & Hansen, supra note 47, at 380.  
 146. Id. at 381.  
 147. Id. at 380.  
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 387. 
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From an instrumental perspective, stakeholder governance 
needs to give a voice to powerful stakeholders in order to 
secure their contribution to the success of the firm. This line of 
thought usually conceptualizes stakeholder dialogue 
strategically and is oriented around the needs of the 
organization such as risk management or the realization of 
opportunities.
152
 
For these corporations, the stakeholder engagement mechanisms 
provided stakeholders with low to intermediate levels of power. 
Sixty-one percent of companies examined granted stakeholders low 
levels of power through stakeholder engagement mechanisms such as 
(i) stakeholder dialogues through forums and meeting and 
(ii) stakeholder advisory roles through which groups of stakeholders 
provide non-binding advice to the corporation.
153
 Spitzeck and 
Hansen note that “when engagement and influence do not come 
together, it can lead to frustration of stakeholders.”154 
Spitzeck and Hansen did find evidence of more impactful 
stakeholder engagement mechanisms. These mechanisms include 
what the authors call (i) “issues collaboration” whereby a limited 
number of stakeholders have a high level of power over discrete 
issues, such as local initiatives; and (ii) strategic collaboration 
whereby stakeholders are integrated into innovating on new products 
and services.
155
 However, Spitzeck and Hansen found that very high 
levels of stakeholder power were attainable only by one group of 
stakeholders: customers.
156
 Spitzeck and Hansen conclude:  
An instrumental dialogue might help companies to share 
strategies and innovate, but it is not capable of aligning the 
worldviews of those inside with those outside the corporate 
boundaries. An instrumental approach to stakeholder 
governance represents a single-loop learning mechanism which 
does not encourage reflection on core values and principles 
 
 152. Id. at 380. 
 153. Id. at 384. 
 154. Id. at 386. 
 155. Id. at 385–86. 
 156. Id. at 386. 
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. . . . [I]t is not enough to remain at the stage of dialogue and 
issues advisory where the real stakeholder impact usually 
remains unobservable. In order to make stakeholder 
governance sustainable, corporations also need to provide 
stakeholders with real power in order to address the issues 
which are important to them.
157
 
Spitzeck and Hansen’s findings are consistent with another important 
qualitative study consisting of interviews with corporate managers, 
the “big five” accounting firms, consultants, and NGOs about social 
and ethical accounting, auditing, and reporting in the UK. In this 
2001 study, the researchers conclude that stakeholder “dialogue” 
through focus groups, meetings, and forums is insufficient to 
facilitate meaningful stakeholder engagement.
158
  
For stakeholder engagement to lead to a meaningful extension 
of corporate accountability, as opposed to representing merely 
a sophisticated management tool, there clearly needs to be 
some mechanism by which stakeholder views can feed directly 
into corporate decision-making and by which stakeholders can 
hold management to account . . . . [T]here is need for 
administrative reform . . . to be accompanied by institutional 
reform designed to empower stakeholders via instituting more 
participatory forms of corporate governance.
159
 
The researchers conclude that “the radical edge of the early social 
audit movement, with its emphasis on holding to account powerful 
economic organisations has been effectively displaced by business 
imperatives . . . [A] process of stakeholder management has 
 
 157. Id. at 387. 
 158. David L. Owen, Tracey Swift & Karen Hunt, Questioning the Role of Stakeholder 
Engagement in Social and Ethical Accounting, Auditing and Reporting, 25 ACCOUNT. FORUM 
264, 265 (2001). “The ‘business case’ orientated approach underpinning SEAAR [social and 
ethical accounting, auditing and reporting] leads to, at best, a ‘soft’ form of accountability, 
whereby organisations engage in stakeholder dialogue for the purpose of voluntary self-
reporting on their trustworthiness as part of reputation building process. . . [S]uch a process, 
which has no institutional rights to information built into it, does little to promote notions of 
participative democracy as current power differentials between organisations and their non-
financial stakeholders remain unaltered and hence ‘mutual vulnerability’ fails to be 
established.” Id. at 275.  
 159. Id. at 272.  
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effectively displaced any meaningful moves towards expanding 
corporate accountability towards stakeholders.”160 Contrary to the 
central argument in this Article, the researchers denounce voluntary, 
self-regulation and ponder whether stakeholder engagement can ever 
amount to more than “rhetoric, spin, or indeed blatant corporate 
propaganda” in the absence of legal reform.161 Notably, the study 
conducted focused on for-profit companies, and not the recent US 
legal reforms that created hybrid corporations. Hybrid corporations 
have legally forgone shareholder primacy in favor of pursuing social 
and financial value; it remains to be seen whether the stakeholder 
engagement process of these hybrid corporations leads to “corporate 
spin” or more meaningful corporate accountability. Because hybrid 
corporate forms are new,
162
 empirical studies of their stakeholder 
engagement processes has yet to be conducted. Nonetheless, both 
studies suggest that stakeholder engagement must move beyond 
rhetoric and dialogue. Impactful stakeholder engagement requires 
that stakeholders be given power to influence and participate in 
corporate decision-making.  
a. Stakeholder Vetoes & Enforcement Rights 
One way to grant stakeholders power is to grant them veto power 
over corporate decisions that might adversely affect the corporation’s 
social mission. Spitzeck and Hansen’s study provides an example of 
informal veto power in a case study of a sustainability-drive fruit 
drink company called “innocent.”163 McDonald’s wanted to partner 
with innocent to provide innocent’s drinks in McDonald’s Happy 
Meals.
164
 Understanding the risk to its “reputation for sustainability,” 
 
 160. Id. at 274–75. 
 161. Id. 277–78. 
 162. Maryland was the first state to enact benefit corporation legislation in 2010. B Lab, 
Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSRWIRE (Apr. 14, 
2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press_releases/29332-Maryland-First-State-in-
Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation. California enacted flexible purpose corporation 
law (since renamed social purpose corporation) in 2012. The Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011, 
S.B. 201, 2011 Gen. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011).  
 163. Spitzeck & Hansen, supra note 47, at 383.  
 164. Id. 
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innocent polled its regular customers on the potential partnership.
165
 
Seventy-two percent of innocent’s regular customers said that they 
agreed with the partnership, and innocent moved ahead with the 
partnership.
166
 However, this approach to empowering stakeholders 
requires careful execution to grant stakeholders actual power. 
Corporate managers must commit to accepting the results of 
stakeholder polling or voting, even if not formally required by law or 
by the corporation’s charter. This approach may also be limited to 
discrete issues where the appropriate stakeholders can be identified. 
Stakeholders must also be responsive and knowledgeable about the 
issues at hand for this stakeholder engagement mechanism to work.
167
  
Social enterprise directors might seek to empower stakeholders 
through a legal veto right. Each of the hybrid corporate forms 
provides a “mission lock”168 whereby the social enterprise’s public 
benefit or social purpose set forth in the corporate charter can only be 
amended by supermajority vote of its shareholders.
169
 However, only 
shareholders can vote on charter amendments. Other stakeholders 
have no voting authority. A social enterprise must look to other 
methods to give stakeholders power to lock in social mission. Rather 
than provide stakeholders with an ex ante right to lock in social 
mission, social enterprise directors might look for ways to provide 
stakeholders an ex post right to enforce, or correct deviations from, 
social mission. Ex post enforcement rights can be accomplished in 
one of two ways, depending on the hybrid corporate form. 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. See Owen, Swift & Hunt, supra note 161, at 279 (“Compliance with statute/standard 
reporting . . . is, for example, liable to generate far more in the way of transparency of corporate 
actions than dialogue (or monologue?) with relatively ill-informed stakeholders can achieve.”).  
 168. For a comparison of “mission lock” methods for social enterprises in G8 countries, see 
Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, Balancing Purpose and Profit: Legal Mechanisms to Lock 
in Social Mission for “Profit with Purpose” Businesses Across the G8, THOMPSON REUTERS 
FOUNDATION, (2014), http://www.trust.org/contentAsset/raw-data/1d3b4f99-2a65-49f9-9bc0-
39585bc52cac/file (last visited Mar 11, 2015).  
 169. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(c) (2014); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION 
§ 201(d); CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000(b) (West 2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.090 
(West 2012). The supermajority voting requirement is a form of “mission lock” but admittedly 
it does not provide absolute assurance that shareholders won’t “sell out” and alter, reduce, or 
void the social enterprise’s commitment to social mission. Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 
6, at 1505–06. 
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First, the Model Legislation allows directors or shareholders 
owning two percent of outstanding shares of a benefit corporation to 
bring a derivative benefit enforcement proceeding “for failure of a 
benefit corporation to pursue or create general public benefit or a 
specific public benefit purpose.”170 Notably, the Model Legislation 
also allows a benefit corporation’s corporate charter or bylaws to 
grant the right to bring a benefit enforcement proceeding to any other 
person.
171
 Therefore, to facilitate “mission lock,” the directors or 
shareholders of a benefit corporation could grant standing in its 
corporate charter or bylaws to a particular group of stakeholders, 
or—though not advisable because it is impractical—all of the 
company’s stakeholders at large. Who comprises the group of 
stakeholders would be entirely context dependent. The stakeholders 
empowered with enforcement rights might be the individual, 
community, or nonprofit beneficiaries that the social enterprise seeks 
to help. Directors might also look outside of stakeholder groups to 
subject-matter experts, such as representatives of independent 
nonprofits working in the same field. However, there are risks in 
granting enforcement rights to non-stockholder stakeholders. 
Stakeholders consist of heterogeneous groups with their own agendas 
to advance. For example, employees’ interests in living wages and 
health benefits may be in conflict with customers’ interests in 
keeping prices low. Each stakeholder group will have their own 
agendas to advance. The directors of a hybrid corporation must 
carefully consider whether to grant enforcement proceeding rights to 
representatives from all or particular groups of stakeholders.  
Second, under Delaware law, stockholders of a public benefit 
corporation can bring a derivative suit to enforce directors’ duty to 
balance (i) stockholders’ pecuniary interests, (ii) “the best interests of 
those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct, and (iii) the 
. . . public benefit or public benefits identified in its [the 
corporation’s] certificate of incorporation.”172 However, stockholders 
 
 170. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 305(c). A benefit enforcement proceeding is 
“[a]ny claim or action or proceeding for: (1) failure of a benefit corporation to pursue or create 
general public benefit or a specific public benefit purpose set forth in its articles; or 
(2) violation of any obligation, duty, or standard of conduct under this [chapter].”) Id. § 102. 
 171. Id. § 305(c)(iv). 
 172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 365(a), 365(b), 367 (2014). 
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must hold at least two percent of the corporation’s outstanding shares 
to have standing in a derivative suit.
173
 Washington and California 
social purpose corporations can be “sued in the same manner as a 
[traditional] corporation”—derivatively by its shareholders.174 
Although Delaware law does not permit granting standing to non-
stockholders, directors of a public benefit corporation could facilitate 
its commitment to its social mission by providing standing to bring a 
derivative suit to stakeholders through a donation of at least two 
percent of its outstanding shares to stakeholders. The shares could be 
donated to a trust or nonprofit, or group of nonprofits, specifically 
tasking them with this enforcement right through a shareholder 
agreement.
175
 The corporation would need to maintain this two 
percent share ownership through additional donations of stock to the 
third party with each new stock issuance. Shares of a social purpose 
corporation could be similarly issued. 
6. Nourish’s Stakeholder Engagement Plan 
As a starting point for creating a framework that prioritizes and 
engages stakeholders, Lola sets out to define Nourish’s stakeholders 
based on the company’s stated specific public benefit or special 
purpose. Recall that Nourish’s specific public benefit or special 
purpose is “to ameliorate hunger, food insecurity, and the by-
products of hunger and food insecurity in disadvantaged, poor, and 
low-income communities.” In light of this mission, Lola identifies the 
company’s initial stakeholders to include its shareholders; 
employees; customers; the individuals who receive donated products; 
disadvantaged, poor, and low-income communities that the company 
 
 173. Id. § 367. 
 174. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.080 (West 2012); CAL. CORP. CODE § 2502.03 
(West 2015) (“A social purpose corporation may be sued in the same manner as a corporation 
as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure.”). 
 175. The idea of granting enforcement rights to a third party watchdog has been proposed 
in the context of Ello’s conversion to a Delaware public benefit corporation. Ello is a social 
media rival to Facebook. Upon becoming a Delaware public benefit corporation, Ello 
announced that it would never sell ads on its platform or sell the private data of its users to third 
parties. Jeff John Roberts, Ello makes a bold promise for an ad-free social network, but omits 
key details, Oct. 24, 2014, https://gigaom.com/2014/10/24/ello-makes-a-bold-promis-for-an-ad-
free-social-network-but-omits-key-details/ (last visited June 5, 2015).  
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targets; community partners that distribute donated products; 
distributors and retail stores; suppliers and their employees; and the 
physical and natural environment affected by the production of 
nutritional bars. By initially defining Nourish’s stakeholders Lola has 
taken the first steps in creating an action plan to engage stakeholders, 
a stakeholder engagement plan. A stakeholder engagement plan 
defines stakeholders, describes reasons to engage with stakeholders, 
describes the level of engagement that the company expects to have 
with each category of stakeholders, and sketches a plan for such 
engagement.
176
 There is no one-size-fits-all stakeholder engagement 
plan, and such a plan must be multi-faceted. “[C]orporations . . . 
require a broad range of stakeholder governance mechanisms 
depending on the readiness of the organization and the task at 
hand.”177 Moreover, the process of developing a plan necessarily 
involves several iterations to ensure the engagement of stakeholders, 
as well as future modification when constituencies and firm 
operations grow or change. Lola commits Nourish’s board to 
annually reassess and revise its stakeholder engagement plan.  
To avoid using stakeholder governance merely as a means of 
creating shareholder value, which would constitute instrumental 
stakeholder governance, Lola also wants to empower stakeholders to 
participate Nourish’s management. She creates a stakeholder 
advisory board whose mission is to identify nonprofit organizations 
and community groups or associations that can represent the interests 
of Nourish’s stakeholders. The groups will hold seats on Nourish’s 
board of directors. Additionally, the groups will be granted a stock 
interest that collectively represents two percent of the outstanding 
stock of Nourish. By holding 2 percent of the outstanding stock, the 
groups will collectively have standing to bring a derivate suit to 
 
 176. Various consulting, management, and NGOs aid firms in creating stakeholder 
engagement plans. Manuals that focus on particular sectors also exist. For example, the 
International Finance Corporation, a member of the World Bank, periodically publishes a 
stakeholder engagement manual for companies working in developing countries. 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION, STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT: A GOOD PRACTICE 
HANDBOOK FOR COMPANIES DOING BUSINESS IN EMERGING MARKETS (2007), available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/938f1a0048855805beacfe6a6515bb18/IFC_Stakeholder 
Engagement.pdf?MOD=AJPERES 
 177. Spitzeck & Hansen, supra note 47, at 387.  
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enforce (i) Nourish’s pursuit of its general and specific public benefit 
(if Nourish is organized as a benefit corporation), or (ii) the directors’ 
fiduciary duties to balance its specific public benefit against 
stockholders’ and stakeholders’ interests (if Nourish is organized as a 
public benefit corporation).  
With the help of an attorney, Lola also creates an internal 
governance policy that dictates that Nourish’s board will consult and 
poll its stakeholders on major corporate decisions that would lead 
Nourish to deviate from its defined social mission, or create 
reputational risks to Nourish’s brand value as a social enterprise. The 
initial steps in stakeholder engagement are manageable for a start-up 
social enterprise like Nourish. 
E. Commit to Assessment, Transparency, and Accountability 
Through Social Reporting 
Hybrid corporations must produce regular reports that assess the 
corporation’s performance in carrying out its mission, so called social 
accounting reports.
178
 Although the requirements of each social 
accounting report differ, the purpose remains the same: 
The annual benefit report is intended to permit an evaluation of 
that performance so that the shareholders can judge how the 
directors have discharged their responsibility to manage the 
corporation and thus whether the directors should be retained 
in office or the shareholders should take other action to change 
the way the corporation is managed. The annual benefit report 
is also intended to reduce “greenwashing” (the phenomenon of 
businesses seeking to portray themselves as being more 
environmentally and socially responsible than they actually 
are) by giving consumers and the general public a means of 
judging whether a business is living up to its claimed status as 
a benefit corporation.
179
 
 
 178. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION §§ 401–02; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) 
(2014); CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b) (West 2015). 
 179. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102 cmt. (commenting on the definition of 
“Third-Party Standard”).  
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Social reporting is central to a hybrid corporation’s commitment to its 
social mission. 
1. Public Benefit Corporation 
Delaware requires that a public benefit corporation provide a 
“statement as to the corporation’s promotion of the public benefit” to 
shareholders at least every two years.
180
 The public benefit statement 
must include  
 1. the objectives the board of directors has established to 
promote such public benefit or public benefits and interests;  
 2. the standards the board of directors has adopted to 
measure the corporation’s progress in promoting such public 
benefit or public benefits and interests;  
 3. objective factual information based on those standards 
regarding the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives 
for promoting such public benefit or public benefits and 
interests; and  
 4. an assessment of the corporation’s success in meeting the 
objectives and promoting such public benefit or public benefits 
and interests.
181
 
2. Benefit Corporation 
Benefit corporations must produce a benefit report for 
shareholders similar to the public benefit statement.
182
 However, 
while benefit reports must be made publicly available,
183
 public 
benefit statements do not.
184
 Additionally, unlike a public benefit 
 
 180. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (2014). 
 181. Id. 
 182. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 401. 
 183. Id. § 402(b). 
 184. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c)(2) (2014). Delaware law allows, but does not require, 
public benefit statements to be made public. Id. 
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corporation,
185
 a benefit corporation must assess and measure its 
performance against a third-party standard that is comprehensive, 
credible, and transparent, and is also “developed by an entity that is 
not controlled by the benefit corporation.”186 Therefore the benefit 
report must also state (i) “the process and rationale for selecting or 
changing the third-party standard used to prepare the benefit 
report,”187 (ii) the reason for any inconsistent application of the third-
party standard or any “change to that standard from the one used in 
the immediately prior report,”188 and (iii) “any connection between 
the organization that established the third-party standard . . . [and] the 
benefit corporation, including any financial or governance 
relationship which might materially affect the credibility of the use of 
the third-party standard.”189 
3. Social Purpose Corporation 
California social purpose corporations must produce an annual 
special purpose MD&A along with standard corporate financial 
statements.
190
 Among other requirements, the special purpose MD&A 
must identify and discuss material actions taken to achieve the 
corporation’s special purpose, “the impact of those actions, including 
the causal relationships between the actions and the reported 
outcomes, and the extent to which those actions achieved the special 
purpose objectives for the fiscal year.”191 Like the benefit report, the 
special purpose MD&A must also discuss the standards used to 
measure the special purpose objectives, including the rationale and 
process for selecting such standards and “any material changes” to 
the standards over the course of the fiscal year.
192
 
 
 185. See id. § 366(c)(3). Delaware law allows, but does not require, public benefit 
corporations to use a third-party standard to assess the corporation’s promotion of the public 
benefit. Id. 
 186. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 102. 
 187. Id. § 401(a)(1)(iv). 
 188. Id. § 401(a)(2)(ii).  
 189. Id. § 401(a)(6). 
 190. CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b) (West 2015). 
 191. Id. § 3500(b)(2). 
 192. Id. § 3500(b)(4). 
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4. Beyond Rhetoric 
The production of such a social accounting report consumes time 
and resources that start-up companies generally do not have. 
Nonetheless, a social accounting report aids the social enterprise in 
expressing and creating a committed approach to its mission. Social 
accounting reports are intended to create transparency to 
shareholders. And if made public, as required of benefit corporations 
and social purpose corporations
193
 and permitted of public benefit 
corporations, the report also provides transparency to non-
stockholder stakeholders by giving them an opportunity to scrutinize 
the corporation’s performance. However, social accounting reports 
that are not transparent and are simply “rhetoric” contribute to 
mission drift and greenwashing.  
Additionally, transparency is not synonymous with accountability 
where stakeholders are not given authority to hold corporate actors 
directly accountable.
194
 Because non-stockholder stakeholders cannot 
bring a derivate suit against a hybrid corporation, they lack direct 
accountability. Social accounting reports, therefore, only offers non-
stockholder stakeholders indirect accountability. Indirect 
accountability is the ability to influence or shape the corporation’s 
action or behavior through less formal means and is derived from 
non-legal sources such as public shaming or negative publicity from 
media and third-party watchdogs, boycotts by consumers, the refusal 
to do business with the corporation, or the resignation of employees 
(or inability to recruit talented employees). Social accounting reports 
facilitate indirect accountability to non-stockholder stakeholders by 
allowing stakeholders to vote with their feet rather than through any 
formal process. But indirect accountability is only viable to the extent 
that (i) a social accounting report is truthful and transparent, and 
(ii) stakeholders are well-informed and organized enough to take 
 
 193. Washington social purpose corporations must make their social purpose reports 
publicly available on their websites. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.150(1) (West 2012). 
California social purpose corporations must make their special purpose MD&A reports publicly 
available on their websites “to the extent consistent with reasonable confidentiality 
requirements.” CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(b) (West 2015).  
 194. See discussion supra Part III.D (noting that shareholders may bring derivative lawsuits 
against hybrid corporations, but non-shareholder stakeholders cannot). 
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adverse action should the report show that the social enterprise fails 
to meet social and environmental standards. Returning to the 
qualitative study of corporate managers and accounting firms 
discussed above, the researchers concluded that true transparency in 
social reporting is difficult to achieve.
195
 Social reporting is not 
standardized, which allows reporting companies to derive their own 
metrics and inhibits outsiders from comparing these metrics across 
companies.
196
 
5. Nourish’s Social Reporting Plan 
At a minimum, the proposed commitment approach requires that 
Nourish produce an annual, rather than biennial, social report that 
Nourish makes public. Nourish also adopts third-party standards by 
which to assess its social performance, rather than develop internal 
standards.
197
 Although Nourish could customize internal standards to 
Nourish’s operations, the use of third-party standards allows 
stakeholders to compare Nourish to other social enterprises and 
provides some confidence that Nourish has not cherry-picked 
favorable outcomes and disregarded unfavorable outcomes. Nourish 
also commits to an assessment that provides annual auditing, so that 
 
 195. Owen, Swift & Hunt, supra note 158, at 372.  
 196. Id. at 271–72 (“There was indeed a broad level of support for further moves toward 
standardisation on the part of many big five and corporate respondents who pointed to the need 
to combat window dressing and develop common indicators in order to promote comparison 
between the performance of different companies”).  
 197. Nourish can choose from among a number of third party standards, including the B 
Impact Assessment; Ceres Roadmap to Sustainability; Global Reporting Initiative; Good Guide 
Company Ratings; or Sustainability Quotient. B Lab developed the B Impact Assessment. 
Performance Requirements, B LAB https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-
become-a-b-corp/performance-requirements (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). The Ceres Roadmap is 
designed to provide a comprehensive platform for sustainable business strategy and for 
accelerating best practices and performance. CERES, http://www.ceres.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 
2015). The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a network-based organization that produces a 
comprehensive sustainability reporting framework that is widely used around the world. 
GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
Good Guide’s mission is to provide authoritative information about the health, environmental 
and social performance of products and companies. GOOD GUIDE, http://goodguide.com/ (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2015). Sustainability Quotient (UL/SQ) is a comprehensive enterprise-level 
sustainability program to facilitate the integration of corporate sustainability best practices in 
enterprises that is built upon third-party verifiable standards such as UL 880. SUSTAINABILITY 
QUOTIENT, http://www.sustainabilityquotient.com/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2015). 
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Nourish’s social accounting reports are not self-reported.198 Nourish 
commits to making its social reporting transparent. Moreover, 
because Nourish has granted some of its stakeholders enforcement 
rights, these stakeholders are organized and capable of holding 
Nourish directly accountable for pursuing its social mission. 
Nourish’s social reporting works in conjunction with its stakeholder 
engagement plan to enhance Nourish’s commitment to its social 
mission.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article has proposed a roadmap for social enterprises formed 
as a benefit corporation, public benefit corporation, or social purpose 
corporation to meet the requirements of social enterprise laws as well 
as voluntarily strengthen their commitment to the pursuit of dual 
missions. The proposed approach accomplishes this through 
governance and the creation of an organization identity that 
prioritizes commitment to a social mission in order to guide directors 
and managers in their dual-mission decision-making. Because social 
enterprise laws have weak accountability mechanisms, social 
enterprises have no choice but to turn to voluntary governance 
policies and procedures to (i) mitigate dual-mission tensions, and 
(ii) internalize as well as publicly express their commitment to 
ameliorating a social or environmental problem. The proposed 
commitment approach requires the social enterprise to (i) focus on a 
defined social or environmental mission, (ii) tasks directors with 
overseeing the social mission, (iii) engage stakeholders in a manner 
that empowers them to participate in corporate decision-making and 
hold the enterprise accountable for failure to pursue its social 
mission, (iv) provide stakeholders with a right to enforce the social 
 
 198. The B Impact Assessment offered by B Lab is a self-reporting system. If a company 
gets a score of eighty on the Assessment (i.e., the threshold for certification), B Lab staff will 
ask for “supporting documentation” for eight to twelve “randomly selected” questions from the 
Assessment to verify the company’s score. B Lab also selects 10 percent of certified B Corps 
for on-site review each year; and certified B Corps must take the B Impact Assessment every 
two years and obtain a minimum score of eighty points to retain the certification. Performance 
Requirements, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/become-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/ 
performance-requirements (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).  
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mission, and (iv) use transparent, standardized, and assessable 
metrics in annual social reporting. As hybrid corporate forms 
proliferate, empirical research should be conducted to elucidate if and 
how social enterprises are able to successfully navigate dual-mission 
tensions and remain committed to their social missions. 
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